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Legal doctrine is a collection of technicalities, but it is not only that.
It is also, often, something more. Legal doctrines embody intuitions
about justice, fairness, efficiency-all the values held by the individuals
who contribute to their formulation. Faced with problems that lack
clear legal answers, judges grope for appropriate solutions; in their grop-
ing, they follow deeply held intuitions about what the law ought to be. It
should be of no surprise that even some of the humblest legal doctrines
reflect much larger philosophical assumptions.
The legal doctrine that I want to put on the current philosophical
agenda-the proper reach of domestic authority across state borders-is
straightforwardly linked to an important jurisprudential question. It
provides a concrete example of one of the most important and difficult
theoretical issues of political philosophy. Viewed doctrinally, it is an is-
sue of state (or national) jurisdiction.1 Viewed philosophically, it is an
issue of the proper reach of state authority as a matter of political theory.
Political philosophy is largely concerned with the legitimacy of state
authority. What gives a state a right to exercise coercive power over
individuals? Why is state power legitimate? If we had a good answer to
this question, then this answer should tell us something about the proper
scope of state power over individuals, because we would have identified
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1. This Article will not address the differences between interstate and international relations,
but will focus on problems as to which the two contexts have been treated similarly. There are, of
course, significant differences between the two contexts as a matter of constitutional law. For exam-
ple, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art 4, § 1, does not apply to international
problems. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930).
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the necessary conditions for legitimate state authority. Coercive power
would be appropriate, then, when the conditions for legitimacy had been
satisfied. The answer to the question "why" should thus give us answers
to the questions "when" and "whether."
Few would be surprised at the claim that political philosophy is rele-
vant in deciding the propriety of state domestic authority.2 Theories of
state legitimacy influence our views about whether it is proper to force
our citizens to pay taxes, serve in the army, or obey the state's criminal
laws. But the answer to the "why" question also helps to spell out the
circumstances in which a state may exercise coercive authority in the
interstate and international setting. An adequate answer should tell us
what sorts of connections with a state are necessary before the state may
assert its power. It should also tell us whether in some particular multi-
state fact pattern, the exercise of state power is legitimate.
Legal scholars can put the insights of political philosophy to good
use in the multistate setting by testing theories of jurisdiction against ac-
cepted notions of political legitimacy. It is also possible, however, to re-
verse the process and put multistate legal doctrines to work in the setting
of domestic political philosophy. If I am correct that domestic theory
has implications for multistate legitimacy, 3 then one ought to be able to
rule out certain domestic political premises, namely those that would
lead to untenable multistate conclusions. If domestic and multijurisdic-
tional theory are to be made consistent, then the process of reasoning
potentially works both ways. Inconsistency can be resolved by changing
either one's domestic or one's multistate convictions-whichever is less
firmly grounded.
My experience is that some of our intuitions about when assertion of
state jurisdiction is appropriate in the interstate context are, indeed,
firmly grounded. This allows us to start with our answers to the question
of "whether" and work backwards to the "why." By examining some
common intuitions about which factors seem to give a state a right to
assert its authority, we can identify which elements of a fact pattern seem
to be responsible for the legitimacy of state power. If we sense that juris-
diction is appropriate where a particular factor is present, then it would
seem that that factor is important to the justification for the use of state
coercive power. Multistate variations provide a series of concrete test
cases to help identify which conditions are necessary and sufficient for
the legitimacy of state power. Having identified these factors in the
2. A possible exception might be those who favor the original-intent method of constitutional
interpretation-who would deny that anything might be relevant other than the Framers' intent.
3. I develop this argument elsewhere at length. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNA-
TIONAL AcTS 52-78 (1989).
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multistate context, we can return to the domestic context with some con-
fidence that the same factors might be relevant there.
My method, then, is to use jurisdictional intuitions to test domestic
political theories, and vice versa. Employing this line of reasoning, I ar-
gue that there are two explanations for why state authority is appropriate
in multistate situations. One explanation relates to direct connections
between the state and the individual, such as residence or domicile;4 the
other relates to an individual's activities or the consequences of those
activities within the state. The first depends on community membership;
the second turns on territorial impact. This dichotomy will be familiar to
teachers of civil procedure or conflicts of laws. The analysis gets more
interesting when we ask why it is that two different sorts of factors legiti-
mate state power. At this point, we have to probe some well-established
legal doctrines to find the political assumptions that lurk underneath.
What we find beneath might be interesting even to those who have
no particular love for civil procedure or conflicts of laws. The reason
that we have two different triggering factors for jurisdiction lies in a fun-
damental duality in our approach to political justification; a duality that
is reflected in two important movements in contemporary political the-
ory. I refer to the current debate between proponents of liberalism and
proponents of communitarianism. Both schools of thought receive sup-
port in the current law of interstate relations. The notion that a state
may regulate activities or consequences that occur within the state re-
flects traditional liberalism. The notion that state authority is most ap-
propriately directed at domiciliaries and local corporations reflects
communitarian assumptions.
Liberalism and communitarianism currently coexist peacefully in
the pages of the United States Reports. Yet many contemporary theorists
assume that only one school can be correct: the positive case for each
theory is built on the negative case against the other. A better view
might be that both are right but that neither captures the whole truth.
Legal doctrine raises the possibility that there are two separate and com-
patible alternatives to explain political authority. The goal of this Article
is to use a set of rather technical doctrines of state jurisdiction to illumi-
nate the relationship between two schools of contemporary political the-
ory. Perhaps in this way we can learn something about the logic of the
law (and of legal philosophy) from the law's experience.
4. By "direct" connections I mean relations between a state and an individual as opposed to
relations that connect a state to an individual via the individual's activities in the state.
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I. MEMBERS VERSUS ACTIVITIES
An explanation of the connection between legal doctrines and the
contemporary philosophical debate must begin with a description of
each. The legal doctrines are familiar and relatively straightforward. At
issue are two different approaches to the reach of state power in legal
disputes that cross state borders. One of these approaches is based upon
membership in a political community; it is referred to as "general juris-
diction." The other is based upon the occurrence of activities or causa-
tion of harm in the forum; it is referred to as "specific jurisdiction." This
dichotomy between general and specific jurisdiction arises in at least
three contexts: state adjudicative jurisdiction, state choice of law, and
extraterritoriality of federal law.
A. General and Specific Jurisdiction: State Adjudicative Jurisdiction,
State Choice of Law, and Extraterritoriality of Federal
Law
Because the dichotomy between general and specific jurisdiction is
best known in the context of adjudicative or "personal" jurisdiction, we
can begin there. General judicial jurisdiction is permissible where a de-
fendant has a direct and substantial connection with the forum. For the
individual it is most commonly based on the defendant's domicile or resi-
dence within the state.5 For the corporation, general jurisdiction may be
based on the fact that the forum is the state of incorporation, the princi-
pal place of business, or the location of substantial and continuous busi-
ness.6 Such jurisdiction is termed "general" because it is indiscriminate
in the reach of state power that it justifies over a particular defendant.
Once general jurisdiction is established, then the forum may assert its
authority over the defendant on any cause of action whatsoever-even
over one having nothing to do with the forum. 7
5. See, eg., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (service on a defendant whose domi-
cile is in Wyoming, but who is absent, is nevertheless sufficient). See generally Lea Brilmayer et al.,
A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 721, 728 (1988) (describing the use of
domicile as a basis for jurisdiction).
Another basis for general jurisdiction over individuals is transient presence of the defendant at
the time of service of process. Such "tag" jurisdiction was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990). Tag jurisdiction is not well explained by
either communitarian or liberal premises. Indeed, the Court itself seemed to acknowledge that the
best justification for tag jurisdiction is its long history of judicial tolerance. See id. at 2115. Tag
jurisdiction had been widely criticized on fairness grounds. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLicT OF LAWS § 28 (1986 revisions); Brilmayer, supra, at 748-55.
6. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952); Brilmayer, supra
note 5, at 733-35.
7. In Perkins, for example, the cause of action arose in the Philippines but suit was brought in
Ohio. 342 U.S. at 447-48.
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Specific jurisdiction is more narrowly focused. It justifies jurisdic-
tion over the defendant only for a cause of action that "arose out of" or
"is related to" the defendant's activities in the forum.8 In a classic case
from first-year civil procedure, a defendant drives into the forum, has an
accident, and is then subject to jurisdiction in the forum on the resulting
tort claim.9 Because this is a case of specific and not general jurisdiction,
the defendant would not, however, be subject to jurisdiction on unrelated
causes of action arising outside of the state (such as a contract suit based
on her failure to pay her credit card bills at home). Another common
fact pattern involves injuries that predictably arise out of manufacture
and shipment of defective products into the state.10 Specific jurisdiction
is based on the defendant's activities or impact within the forum.
This thumbnail description of general and specific jurisdiction
avoids the hardest cases in defining the two concepts. In the case of gen-
eral jurisdiction, difficulties usually arise when a defendant has some
measure of contact with the forum, but less than that of a local domicili-
ary or a locally incorporated business. The key difficulty is to specify the
requisite quantity of contact." One of the thorniest specific jurisdiction
problems arises when the defendant has not physically entered the forum
but his activities outside the forum have brought about local harm.1 2 In
such cases, the "predictability" or voluntary causation of the local harm
must be established.1 3 As will be explained, it is significant that these are
8. The precise relationship between these two terms is unclear. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419-28 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
there is a "substantial difference" between the terms "arose out of" and "related to"). For a debate
over the meanings of these terms, compare Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REv. 610, 652-62 (1988) and Mary Twitchell, A Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1465 (1988) (criticizing my approach of limiting "relating to" to contacts that have
substantive relevance to the issue of liability) with Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1444, 1451-64 (1988) (defending that approach and criticizing
possible alternatives).
9. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
10. See, eg., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill.
1961) (out-of-state manufacturer of exploded water heater subject to personal jurisdiction in state of
malfunction); cf McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding California
statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts made with Cali-
fornia residents).
11. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
12. See, eg., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that
personal jurisdiction over tire valve assemblies manufacturer in Japan was unreasonable and re-
jecting personal jurisdiction based on "stream of commerce"); World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (New York automobile retailer and wholesaler not subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Oklahoma because they do not directly serve the Oklahoma market).
13. See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Cr. REv. 77, 94 (analyzing predictability
issue in terms of proximate cause).
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the key borderline issues; 14 for present purposes, however, what matters
is the simple distinction between jurisdiction based upon substantial per-
sonal connection with the forum and jurisdiction based upon activities or
harms that occur there.
Although the terms "general" and "specific" are best known in the
context of adjudicative jurisdiction, an analogous dichotomy exists with
legislative jurisdiction, or choice of law. In the interstate context, some
decisions to apply forum law are predicated upon direct affiliations be-
tween the parties and the state, whereas others are based on the occur-
rence of activities or impact within the state. Into the first category fall
both old-fashioned choice of law rules15 and more modem principles. 16
The second category also includes both traditional and modem holdings.
The old learning, for example, would allow a state to apply its law to a
tort case when an injury occurred there. 17 Modem approaches would
allow states to regulate local activities or impact on a deterrence
theory.18
The connection between the general/specific distinctions in the con-
texts of adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction should be obvious. Gen-
eral jurisdiction grounds a state's right to regulate a local defendant's
activities outside the state on a direct and substantial connection between
the forum and the defendant. It is triggered by membership in the com-
munity. The theory of specific jurisdiction authorizes forum regulation
of events that occur within the state, without requiring that the parties
themselves be members of the local community. It is triggered by local
activity or impact. The same principle is involved whether the authority
asserted is legislative or judicial.
A third and final example of the dichotomy between general and
specific jurisdiction also involves legislative jurisdiction, but in the inter-
national rather than the interstate context. In some respects, the extra-
territoriality of American federal law is doctrinally very different from
14. See infra text accompanying notes 82-91.
15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 295 (1934) (stating that validity of a
trust of personal property created by will is governed by the law of the state where decedent was
domiciled at time of death); id. § 306 (stating that validity and effect of a will of movables is deter-
mined by the law of the state where decedent was domiciled at the time of death).
16. One such modern principle involves so-called "false conflicts"-when the parties have a
common domicile, that state's law is applied. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 58-60 (1991) (explaining why common domicile cases are
usually false conflicts); John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 206 (1981) (same).
17. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 378 (1934).
18. See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666, 672 (Cal. 1974) ("As to defendants the
state interest in creating wrongful death actions is to deter conduct.").
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interstate choice of law. 19 It is in one way, however, similar: A compa-
rable dichotomy exists between jurisdiction founded on direct links be-
tween the forum and the parties and jurisdiction founded on local impact
or events. As with our first two examples, there are two sorts of trigger-
ing factors: membership and activities. Because this is perhaps the most
interesting instance of the general/specific dichotomy, it is worth
presenting some concrete examples.
First, consider the reach of American antitrust law. Early in this
century, it was assumed that our antitrust laws would only apply to con-
duct that occurred within the United States. 20 More recent decisions
have been much more expansive, resulting in the application of Ameri-
can law to conduct having an intentional impact on local markets2 l
under a theory of "impact territoriality." Briefly stated, jurisdiction
under this theory is based upon occurrence of harm within the United
States, rather than upon a party's membership in the American commu-
nity. In other contexts, however, jurisdiction rests upon membership in
the community, particularly community membership of the defendant.22
Some statutes specifically so provide. 23
In other cases, the statute is silent and a court must determine
its reach. For example, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO),24 the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not apply ex-
traterritorially to an American employer who discriminates against an
American employee in another country (in this case, Saudi Arabia).2 5 In
19. For example, extraterritoriality analysis heavily relies on a presumption that Congress, un-
less it states otherwise, prefers to limit application of federal law to activities that occur on U.S.
territory. See, eg., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) ("[L]egislation of Con-
gress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply'only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A
Methodological and ConstitutionalAppraisal, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 11 (com-
paring the problems of the application of American law to international disputes to the problems of
domestic conflict of laws).
20. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
21. See, e.g., United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[A]ny state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.").
22. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1956) (applying Lanham Act to activi-
ties of U.S. citizen in Mexico); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402(2) (1986) ("Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to... the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory.").
23. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932) (applying 28 U.S.C. §§ 711-718
(1926) to allow issuance of subpoena to U.S. citizen in France).
24. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
25. See id. at 1235-36. The Court held that unless affirmative congressional intent indicates
otherwise, legislation of Congress applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
In this case, despite Title VII's broad jurisdictional language and an alien exemption clause, the
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ARAMCO, the plaintiff was an American citizen. For purposes of illus-
tration, however, consider a case in which the employer is American but
the employee is Saudi Arabian, and the complained-of activity occurred
(as in ARAMCO itself) in Saudi Arabia. This fact pattern presents a
somewhat weaker argument for application of American law because one
of the American contacts has been removed. It is more interesting be-
cause it presents more starkly the phenomenon of jurisdiction based on
membership.
As a legal matter, ARAMCO turns primarily on a question of statu-
tory interpretation: Did Congress want the law to apply to such a fact
pattern? 26 For it is clear, as a legal matter, that Congress may do so if it
desires. This is not, as some believe, because the Constitution does not
limit extraterritorial application of federal statutes; I feel quite certain
that it does.27 The reason, rather, is that as a constitutional matter, the
defendant's membership in the American community provides an ade-
quate basis for application of our law.28 The question is, therefore,
whether Congress exercised power that it undoubtedly possesses.
In summary, whether in the context of judicial jurisdiction, state
choice of law, or extraterritoriality of federal law, we see two different
types of justification for assertion of state power. General jurisdiction is
based upon a connection between the forum and the defendant, and au-
thorizes power over any disputes to which the local party is a defendant.
Specific jurisdiction is based upon the location of activities or conse-
quences, and authorizes power only over cases that involve those local
occurrences. The key difficulty in ascertaining the existence of general
jurisdiction is whether a sufficient quantity of contact has been shown;
the key difficulty with specific jurisdiction is whether the local occur-
rences were voluntary or foreseeable to the defendant. I argue that this
dichotomy reflects a debate in contemporary political theory-namely,
the debate between liberals and communitarians. The next task, there-
fore, is to describe this contemporary debate.
Court determined that Congress did not intend to regulate practices of U.S. employers abroad. See
id.
26. See id. at 1229; see also Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437; Brilmayer, supra note 19, at 14.
27. See Brilmayer, supra note 19, at 14; see also Lea Brilmayer and Charles Norchi, Federal
Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. (1992) (forthcoming).
But see Friedrick K. Juenger, Constitutional Control or Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor
Brilmayer's Appraisal, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39, 43-44 (denying applicability
of Constitution).
28. See Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437-42.
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B. Liberalism and Communitarianism
Contemporary political theory is preoccupied with a debated be-
tween liberals and communitarians.2 9 On the liberal side, the most prom-
inent name is John Rawls, 30 but the debate also implicates the work of
other writers such as Ronald Dworkin3t and Bruce Ackerman. 32 The
communitarian critics of liberalism include Michael Sandel, 33 Alasdair
MacIntyre, 34 Richard Rorty,35 and Charles Taylor.36
To a communitarian, the key value is community membership. The
community is both the chief source of political norms and an important
source of personal identity. As Michael Walzer explains, community
membership is the key value because membership is the criterion for dis-
tribution of all other social goods. 37 Communitarians tend to emphasize
the importance of community traditions in the establishment of political
principles. 38 They reject the possibility of universalist reasoning that
would ground principles valid for all times and places. 39 Political norms
are contextual because norms arise out of the shared history of a particu-
lar community.40 The personal identities that we come to have, likewise,
can only be appreciated in the context of the communities that-shape us.
Liberals focus on a different key characteristic-personal auton-
omy. 41 This emphasis is sometimes explained in terms of equality, for
29. For general descriptions of this debate, see LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J.
Sandel ed., 1984); UNIVERSALISM VS. COMMUNITARIANISM (David M. Rasmussen ed., 1990); Amy
Gutman, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 308 (1985); Will Kymlicka,
Liberalism and Communitarianism, 18 CAN. J. PHIL. 181 (1988); see also Stephen A. Gardbaum,
Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideas After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1991).
30. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
31. See, eg., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240-58 (1977); Ronald Dwor-
kin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
32. See, eg., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
33. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
34. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUS-
TICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?].
35. See Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE
FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 257 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
36. See Charles Taylor, Hegel: History and Politics, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra
note 29, at 177.
37. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-32 (1983).
38. See, eg., MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 34, at 6-11 (arguing that the failure of
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers to agree upon uniform principles of rationality re-
quires a return to notions of rationality grounded in tradition).
39. See id.
40. See DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 239 (1985).
41. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS 9, 14 (1984) (endorsing a presumption in favor of liberty, and ascribing that presumption to
liberalism). This definition of the key element of liberalism, of course, sweeps in philosophers such
as Robert Nozick who might today be called libertarian or conservative rather than liberal because
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liberalism rests (some say) on principles of equal concern and respect.42
The community is not supposed to favor one moral position over an-
other, for instance by attempting to inculcate its citizens with some par-
ticular moral point of view. The protection of autonomy, furthermore,
emphasizes the importance of individual voluntariness, for obligations
should come to rest on an individual by virtue of voluntary assumption.43
This sketch is so brief as to be a virtual caricature. Even so, it is
enough to make out a prima facie case that general jurisdiction seems to
reflect communitarian assumptions whereas specific jurisdiction seems to
reflect liberal ones. The connection between communitarianism and gen-
eral jurisdiction is that the key element in the justification of state author-
ity is community membership. The connection between liberalism and
specific jurisdiction is that membership is downplayed: the key element
instead is voluntary activity or causation of harm. The communitarian-
ism/general jurisdiction connection is probably the easier one to spell out
and therefore a good place to start. In taking a closer look at the philo-
sophical assumptions that underlie general jurisdiction, we see how juris-
diction based upon local domicile or incorporation is both easy to square
with communitarian theory and apparently anomalous in liberal theory.
Once this task is completed, we turn our attention to specific jurisdiction;
there we show that although communitarianism is not particularly well-
equipped to deal with jurisdiction based on activities, liberal theory ex-
plains specific jurisdiction fairly well.
II. MEMBERSHIP AS A BASIS FOR INTERSTATE AUTHORITY
General jurisdiction is primarily based upon membership in the lo-
cal community. For individuals, as we have said, this typically means
domicile or residence, whereas for corporations this typically means that
the defendant either is incorporated in the forum, has its principal place
of business there, or has substantial and continuous business there. One
factor that explains why general jurisdiction is fair is that local residents
and businesses have a political voice in state decisionmaking, either
through voting or through the exercise of informal political clout.44 But
of their enthusiasm for the free market. See ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974).
42. See DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 263.
43. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 14 (1979) (cit-
ing H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 179 n.7 (1955)). Where actual
assumption of obligations is implausible, hypothetical or tacit agreement is sometimes relied upon.
See SANDEL, supra note 33, at 179 (criticizing the requirement of voluntariness).
44. Compare Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 87 ("[S]ystematic... activity [unrelated to the litiga-
tion], such as domicile, incorporation, or doing business, suggests that the person or corporate entity
is enough of an 'insider' that he may safely be relegated to the State's political process.").
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voice cannot be the whole answer because even politically powerless indi-
viduals are subject to state authority. Because a showing of political in-
fluence is not required in particular cases, the better explanatory variable
would seem to be the mere fact that the defendant is a member of the
local community.
C6mmunitarians should find such reasoning easily intelligible.
Political obligation is founded, first and foremost, on membership in the
community. Community and traditions are the source of a society's
laws; political reasoning is contextual and no political principles are fun-
damentally true for all societies and in all historical periods. Further-
more, the relationship between the community and the individual is an
intimate one. Our personalities are largely shaped by the communities of
which we are a part. We do not arbitrarily choose to be certain sorts of
people, or to have certain preferences and beliefs; instead, we respond to
our social environments. This intimate connection between the individ-
ual and society is a positive thing. It provides us with a sense of belong-
ing and an ability to make sense of the world around us.
Communitarianism leads naturally to a view that interstate author-
ity should be based on community membership. Under the communitar-
ian view, the community would have an interest in regulating the
individual regardless of the location in which the individual acts and
without concern for the victim's residence. The connecting factor that
interests the communitarian is the individual who is constrained by the
exercise of state authority.4 5 As long as that individual is a member of
the community, the communitarian should be satisfied that the state has
a legitimate concern with the dispute. Communitarianism does not seem
to provide a justification for coercion over nonmembers.
The liberal view is rather different. Liberals typically deny the com-
munity extensive powers over the arguably private aspects of individuals'
lives.46 The individual is thought to be entitled to autonomy over purely
personal matters, as long as he or she does not interfere with comparable
autonomy of others. Actions that are purely private are not properly the
state's business. The state is not supposed to "legislate morality." 47
Liberals might well be doubtful about general jurisdiction for ex-
actly the reasons that communitarians find general jurisdiction attractive.
45. For a discussion of whether the community membership of the victim should be relevant,
see infra text accompanying note 76.
46. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 17 (1986).
47. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 5 (1963); cf DWORKIN, supra note 31,
at 240-58 (discussing Lord Devlin's arguments supporting state legislation of morality).
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Recall the earlier discussion of whether Title VII ought to apply extrater-
ritorially.48 We hypothesized a variation on ARAMCO, in which the dis-
pute's sole connection with the United States was that the defendant
employer was American. If jurisdiction were to be recognized, it would
probably be based on a theory of general jurisdiction because member-
ship in the community is (in this hypothetical) the sole predicate for state
authority. One might at first imagine that a liberal should applaud such
a result; Title VII is a liberal statute, and many liberals would probably
approve the broadest possible application of it.
But how would a liberal justify this conclusion? The explanation
that immediately comes to mind would revolve around the presumed in-
terest of the United States in ensuring that its citizens behave morally
both at home and abroad. This is, indeed, one of the arguments offered
in the briefs on behalf of the plaintiff in ARAMCO. 49 The state has aper
se interest in the morality of its members. Is such an argument consis-
tent with liberalism? To show why it probably is not, we should pause to
examine one of the basic tenets of liberalism: the so-called "harm
principle."
A. The Harm Principle
The harm principle, usually attributed to John Stuart Mill, holds
that the sole permissible basis for government intervention in people's
lives is the prevention of harm to others.50 Government is not entitled to
act for paternalistic reasons-coercing an individual for his or her own
benefit. Neither is government supposed to interfere with private liberty
to protect traditional culture, or to upgrade the moral character of its
citizenry. Prevention of harm or compensation to others is the only legit-
imate state function. A key contemporary proponent of the harm princi-
ple is Joel Feinberg, who examines and defends its ramifications in his
four-volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.5'
Supporters of the harm principle recognize that it raises difficul-
ties.5 2 In the classic debate over the harm principle, liberals have relied
48. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
49. See Brief of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 12-14, EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), I11 S. Ct. 1227 (1991)
(No. 89-1845).
50. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 5-12 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1929) (1859).
51. FEINBERG, supra note 41; JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARM TO SELF (1986); JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING (1988).
52. Feinberg devotes the entire first volume of his set to addressing some of its difficulties. See
FEINBERG, supra note 41.
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on such examples as prohibitions of private sexual conduct between con-
senting adults and restrictions on.pornographic literature.5 3 Additional
examples might include requirements that motorcyclists wear helmets
and the criminalization of certain addictive drugs. But even these para-
digm examples have provoked controversy. What exactly is to count as a
harm? What about harms to natural resources or animals? Should the
promotion of benefits count as much as the prevention of harms? Should
it count as a basis for government action that some activity causes deeply
felt offense to some section of the community? How certain must the
government be that harm will, in fact, occur? The debate raises both
normative questions about what harms should be preventable, and em-
pirical issues about the likelihood that certain kinds of conduct actually
cause harm. The harm principle is not easy to apply in practice.
And in addition, there is continuing debate over whether the harm
principle is valid even in principle. One prominent critic of the liberal
position, Lord Devlin, entered the debate in response to recommenda-
tions that certain sorts of sexual offenses be legalized.5 4 He argued that
one reason to allow regulation of consensual conduct that does not cause
harm to others is that society has a right to enforce certain minimum
moral standards of decency, simply to affirm its moral code.5 5 Both
H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin have responded to Lord Devlin, de-
fending the liberal point of view.5 6
One example of the dispute's contemporary relevance is the regula-
tion of smoking; another is the prohibition of pornography. In part, the
argument for banning pornography rests on arguments that would be
entirely consistent with liberal premises, such as the claim that pornogra-
phy leads to assaults on women.5 7 But the debate is undoubtedly colored
by a perception that pornography is simply vile. After all, automobiles
also cause a great deal of damage, but few argue that we should ban them
because of the benefits that they otherwise provide. Pornography is not
typically thought of as providing much of a benefit; this is probably be-
cause reading or making a living off of pornography is considered by
many to be morally reprehensible.
These examples illustrate a key difference between the liberal and
communitarian point of view. Does the state have a legitimate role in
53. See, eg., HART, supra note 47, at 5 (sexual morality); DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 240-58
(homosexuality and pornography).
54. See LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).
55. See id. at 7-25.
56. See HART, supra note 47, at 17-24; DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 240-58.
57. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 147 n.9 (1987).
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forming its citizen's moral character? Liberals argue that moral charac-
ter is not per se the state's business; moral eduction is proper only to
prevent individuals from harming others. Communitarians, in contrast,
believe that our personalities are inevitably shaped by the societies that
we inhabit, and that it is not possible to imagine ourselves abstracted
from the characteristics that we have acquired in this way. Furthermore,
communitarians seem largely to think that this is a good thing.58
This difference seems naturally to lead to different attitudes toward
interstate authority. The communitarian, we noted earlier, would au-
thorize the state to assert authority over community members regardless
of where their activities occurred. The liberal, in contrast, ought perhaps
to be skeptical about whether mere membership, without more, is an ade-
quate basis for regulation. And as the harm principle suggests, the lib-
eral ought to focus instead on the occurrence of harm within state
territory, because prevention of harm is the sole legitimate basis for exer-
cise of state authority. This does not mean that liberals cannot approve
the exercise of state authority when objectionable conduct occurs locally
and the injury occurs outside the state. In such circumstances, the local
conduct has at least created a risk of local injury; this should be enough
as a basis for regulation. 59 It does, however, suggest that activities that
occur elsewhere should not be regulated when they do not threaten local
harm.
How, then, would the liberal justify application of Title VII to our
variation on the ARAMCO case? The obvious argument for applying
Title VII would be simply that it is morally wrong to discriminate; but
this argument in its simplest form seems ruled out (for liberals) by the
harm principle. With the best tool for the job apparently disqualified, the
58. See, eg., MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 34, at 388 (describing the alienation of
"rootless cosmopolitanism" in which individuals in fact become "citizens of nowhere"). As Ian
Shapiro argues, it is unclear what contextualist authors would do about societies that are inherently
evil. See IAN SHAPIRO, POLITICAL CRITICISM 54 (criticizing Richard Rorty's uncritical acceptance
of the status quo); id. at 139 (discussing MacIntyre).
59. This raises the question of what to do when it is clear that the defendant's conduct,
although occurring locally, cannot cause harm within the state. Perhaps the defendant manufac-
tures a defective product inside the state but is careful to distribute the product only out-of-state. Of
course, someone might still return the product to the forum, where it causes injury. But the local
injury is no more likely in such a case than if an out-of-state manufacturer engaged in similar precau-
tions to prevent the goods entering the forum. If the sole consideration is local harm, it does not
seem that situations where the local manufacturer sends goods out-of-state present a better case for
jurisdiction than do situations where the out-of-state manufacturer does not send goods into the
forum.
A liberal would probably not favor jurisdiction in a case where the defendant's local conduct
creates no risk of local harm. The harm principle is offended by penalizing conduct that does not
create a risk of harm-whether the conduct is penalized because it is thought immoral or simply
because local persons do not want the activity to occur within the state.
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liberal must somehow fall back on more cumbersome justifications to ap-
ply Title VII-or else give up on Title VII's application to such cases
altogether. The more cumbersome methods might involve either show-
ing how discrimination abroad causes harms within the United States or
explaining why a liberal's concern should extend to harm to outsiders.
Let us briefly examine these two strategies for regulating cases that in-
volve local community membership without local impact.
B. Membership Without Impact: The Liberal Response
1. Preventing Harm in the United States. The first strategy that a
liberal might adopt to justify application of Title VII to our ARAMCO
variation 6° would be to claim that even where the only connection with
the United States is the defendant's local residence, application of Title
VII is still necessary to prevent harm within the United States. General
jurisdiction would be squared with liberalism by arguing that the harm
principle is in fact satisfied.
A liberal might, for instance, claim that application of Title VII to
American defendants is necessary to protect the image of Americans
abroad. There would be undesirable consequences for the nation as a
whole if Americans were perceived as racist or sexist. A desire to project
a particular public image might be motivated by the need to demonstrate
that we do not lag behind other nations in our commitment to eradicat-
ing racism. Putting an end to segregation in education was characterized
as a "cold war imperative" because segregation was thought to convey
the wrong impression to developing nations.61
In the alternative, a liberal might believe that adopting nondiscrimi-
nation standards would set a good example for nations that continue to
discriminate on the basis of gender or race. To the extent that we could
encourage other states to adopt similar legal principles, Americans would
receive greater protection from discrimination when they travel abroad.
Or, it is possible that if we insist on the application of Title VII abroad,
our own people will be more likely to internalize the principle of nondis-
crimination and thus be less likely to discriminate against fellow Ameri-
cans. If our citizens are allowed to discriminate when they are in other
countries, then they are more likely to continue this sort of behavior
when they return home.62
60. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
61. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61
(1988).
62. Another argument might be that Title Vii should be applied extraterritorially to prevent
American companies from committing discrimination by simply transferring employees to another
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Some or all of these arguments may be plausible as liberal bases for
applying Title VII extraterritorially. Yet it is unclear whether they pro-
vide a complete explanation; they seem instead to be ad hoc rationaliza-
tions. They do not explain why proponents of applicability have
frequently made the "moral character" argument, and why it has been
claimed that the United States has an interest in the morality of its citi-
zens that are abroad. It remains a possibility that a liberal justification
for applicability could be constructed by careful attention to the local
harms that would occur from allowing Americans to discriminate
abroad. If so, then perhaps my point should merely be that liberals
should doubt one of the reasons that has been given for this result. The
point should address the nature of the justification that can be offered for
extraterritoriality, rather than the legitimacy of applying Title VII to cer-
tain sorts of facts; it should concern the means of analysis, rather than
the substantive bottom line.
2. Preventing Harm to Outsiders. These liberal arguments try to
satisfy the requirement of a local harm, but it is also possible that a lib-
eral should resist the claim that a local harm must be shown. Liberals
might offer a second sort of argument about extraterritoriality-one
which takes on my hypothetical more directly. The liberal might claim
that although it must be shown that the defendant's activities caused
harm, it need not be shown that the harm occurred within the United
States. The liberal might attempt to distinguish, in other words, between
cases of nonresident harm and cases of nonexistent harm. Only in the
case of nonexistent harm would the state be guilty of "legislating
morality. ' 63
This response raises issues of consent. Most liberals would recog-
nize that a victim might consent to "injury" and would claim that when
such consent occurs, the harm principle has not been satisfied. 64 This is
why (for example) regulation of private consensual sexual activity cannot
be justified (in liberal terms) on the grounds of the "harm" that each of
the actors perpetrates upon the other. There is something resembling
consent in situations where American law is applied extraterritorially, to
the benefit of a nonresident victim. The consent argument would be that
country before maltreating them. This is not a true case of extraterritoriality, however, because in
such a situation the objectionable action would have occurred within the United States.
63. One basis for this conclusion might be that it is discriminatory to deny the benefits of Title
VII to nonresidents. This begs the question, however, for "discrimination" is improper only if there
is no basis for the difference in treatment. The question posed here, however, is precisely whether an
adequate basis for different treatment exists.
64. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 41, at 116-17 (describing John Stuart Mill's acceptance of
this proposition).
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by being part of a society that adopted a different set of laws that permits
the conduct in question, the victim has consented to the injury. This
argument seems to fit, moreover, with the liberal pluralist claim that we
are not entitled to intervene in other cultures, but should respect the dif-
ferent choices they have made to regulate their societies. 65
In the actual ARAMCO case, which arose in Saudi Arabia, we
might not feel comfortable making such a consent argument, for the vic-
tims of discrimination (particularly victims of sex discrimination) did not
consent because they were not allowed to vote. Conceivably, it might be
claimed that the victims nonetheless consented by continuing to live in
Saudi society,66 although I emphatically would not want to press the
consent argument very far in this specific context. The argument does,
however, raise some interesting questions in other contexts, where this
objection to consent theories cannot be made. Even in a society with fair
electoral processes, a liberal might reject the consent argument as
implausible.
A liberal might argue, for instance, that it does not matter whether
the other state's laws permit discrimination; one cannot waive one's right
to sue for discrimination, because it is just too important a right. This
line of response is not particularly promising as a way to square extrater-
ritorial regulation with Mill's harm principle. 67 It seems too paternalistic
to be consistent with traditional liberal assumptions, because it assumes
that the state is better able to judge what is in people's own best interests
than are the people themselves.
A better response might be that individual consent cannot be in-
ferred from passage of laws because at best the passing of laws shows that
a majority consents. According to this argument one might want to ask
whether the particular victim in question had approved or opposed dis-
crimination legislation when it was proposed. If the victim had opposed
adoption of a domestic cause of action for discrimination, perhaps we
would then say that he or she had consented. This does not necessarily
follow, however; if it did, we would deprive domestic opponents of Title
65. See, eg., CHARLES R. BErrz, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1979). Beitz discusses the claim that intervention is morally objectionable because it offends a right
of autonomy. Id. at 69-83. He ultimately rejects this argument, however, and concludes that inter-
vention is morally objectionable because it offends principles of justice. Id. at 69.
66. This tacit consent argument has been much criticized. See DAVID HUME, Of the Original
Contract, in HUME'S ETHICAL WRITINGS 356 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1948); Hanna Pitkin, Obligation
and Consent-I, 59 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 990, 994-98 (1965).
67. A better version of the "no waiver" argument might be that the waiver is ineffective because
the victims were under duress due to social pressure not to vote for discrimination legislation, were
deliberately kept ill-informed by opponents of the legislation, or were for some other procedural
reason unable to exercise effective choice.
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VII of a cause of action. Conversely, it is not clear that proponents of
antidiscrimination legislation have failed to consent. For it is not com-
pletely illogical to talk about groups that consent on behalf of individu-
als, especially where the group is formed for the express political purpose
of taking stands on whether certain causes of action should exist.
Whether or not this "consent" response to liberals can be made to
work, the basic puzzle for the liberal still remains. Assume for the mo-
ment that the liberal is entitled to care as much about harm to nonresi-
dents as to residents. How, then, can the liberal explain a jurisdictional
test that differentiates along the lines of the defendant's community
membership? Admittedly, a liberal might recognize that it is inappropri-
ate to assert state authority in all cases, and that a line has to be drawn
somewhere.68 But why draw it at this point? Absent some sort of com-
munitarian assumptions, it is hard to see why states would allocate au-
thority between themselves on the basis of the parties' affiliation with
particular states, rather than in some other manner.
At a minimum, the liberal should at least acknowledge that general
jurisdiction poses special problems of justification. The obvious an-
swer-that the state has a concern per se with the morality of its mem-
bers-must be ruled out. Perhaps my arguments about general
jurisdiction are best understood, then, as merely posing a challenge to
liberals to explain why membership is an adequate basis for authority in
the interstate setting. Liberals should explain either why the member-
ship of the defendant shows that a harm has occurred within the United
States or why the state should concern itself with victims that have been
injured by Americans as opposed to ones injured by non-Americans.
Liberalism may not be literally inconsistent with general jurisdiction, but
it is interesting to try to figure out why the two might be compatible.
As an example of this question, Title VII provides a nice irony. It
is, of course, a statute that liberals generally approve. I assume that most
liberals would wish to see the law more broadly applicable; liberal
groups, for instance, filed amicus briefs in the ARAMCO case.69 But
68. I am grateful to Chris Schroeder for raising a similar point, although I suspect that we still
disagree. One liberal rejoinder might be that the line can be drawn according to community mem-
bership because only members are allowed to vote. The main problem with this argument is that the
right to vote itself is determined by community membership. Pointing to the right to vote does not
solve the problem because we can only impose an exchange of legal obligation for voting rights on
community members; nonmembers cannot become obligated to obey our laws by virtue of our deci-
sion to accord them voting rights. See BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 54-55.
69. See, eg., Brief of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (No. 89-
1845); Brief of the International Human Rights Law Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Position of Petitioner, ARAMCO (No. 89-1845); Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners, ARAMCO (No. 89-1845); Brief Amicus
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rhetoric about enforcing morality for the sake of the improved moral
character of our citizens seems better suited to Lord Devlin than to liber-
als. I admit that when this irony became apparent to me, it caused me to
take a somewhat closer look at some of my own beliefs. I consider my-
self a liberal and had never stopped to wonder whether my general ap-
proval of the harm principle might not sit a bit uncomfortably with my
taste for a relatively expansive interpretation of Title VII and similar
statutes.
Perhaps this different reaction to the morality argument in the two
contexts might only be due, in my own case, to a different attitude to-
ward different moral principles. Those of us who believe that our compa-
nies should be forced to conform to Title VII abroad, but that - our
government should not enforce sexual morality at home, may simply find
one moral argument more compelling than the other. The fact is that I
do find race and sex discrimination wrong, whereas I am not particularly
convinced by arguments that extramarital sexual relations or homosexual
acts between consenting adults are immoral.70 Of course, if this is the
case, then it would be more honest simply to say that I do not think our
government should force upon us its vision of morality, when that vision
is morally "mistaken."
III. ACTIVITIES AND INJURY AS A BASIS OF STATE AUTHORITY
If the liberals should be a bit puzzled about how to address cases in
which membership is the only basis for state authority, communitarians
should be uncertain about the converse problem: cases in which there is
activity or impact within a state but the individual subject to state au-
thority is not a member of the community. Just as authority triggered by
community membership is apparently anomalous to liberals, authority
triggered by impact is anomalous to communitarians. Anomaly or no
anomaly, outsiders are nonetheless held to community standards when
they act within the territorial limits of the community or when they
cause foreseeable harm within the community.
Many different types of laws apply to nonmembers, some regulating
business practices and morals, and others regulating more private types
Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioners, ARAMCO (No. 89-
1845).
70. One should probably differentiate between two related positions: First, that victimless acts
should not be penalized because they are per se not immoral; and second, that although some vic-
timless acts may be immoral they should nonetheless not be criminalized. The classic liberal posi-
tion is the latter; a liberal might believe that failure to believe in God or the use of addictive drugs is
immoral even if no one is injured. Although I do not believe that victimless acts are automatically
morally acceptable, the fact that some act is victimless (e.g., consensual homosexuality) may be one
factor in the moral equation.
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of conduct. American willingness to apply our antitrust laws has been
notorious (and unpopular).71 Recently, actions have been brought
against former Philippine government officials for RICO violations, 72
and we have brought General Manuel Noriega to the United States for
trial for violations of U.S. drug laws.73 We apply our product liability
laws to foreign manufacturers 74 and our securities laws to foreign sell-
ers.75 Can this be squared with reliance on community membership as a
basis for coercion?
In one sense, such cases make perfect sense to the communitarian.
The purpose of regulating the conduct is to prevent harms to the commu-
nity. But this does not adequately explain why the state has a right to
impose its will on the outsider.76 Community membership of the affected
parties does not seem to be a fair justification for the coerced persons;
more must be done to explain the coercion of outsiders. As a theory,
then, communitarianisin is necessarily incomplete. It fails to tell us why
and in what circumstances a community may impose its will upon
nonmembers.
Specific jurisdiction sits uneasily with communitarianism for two
reasons. The first is that, by alleging that political argument is only pos-
sible within particular communities, communitarianism suggests that
there can be no principled way to develop standards to determine
whether an outsider can be held to local law. This is a methodological
issue, for the problem is that communitarian theory is contextual
whereas norms between communities seem universalistic. The second is
that the standards that are currently used to determine whether specific
jurisdiction is appropriate in particular cases place great emphasis on
consent and voluntariness-traditional liberal values. Whereas the first
point relates to the source of fairness standards, the second relates to
their content. Together, these two arguments make the following point:
It is both necessary and possible to develop fairness norms that operate
71. See Brilmayer, supra note 19, at 21 (discussing the dissatisfaction of foreign parties and
governments with the extraterritorial expansion of U.S. antitrust laws).
72. See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 1355
(1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989).
73. See Jurors Selected for Noriega Trial, N.Y. TIMs, Sept. 14, 1991, § 1, at 8.
74. See, ag., Holmes v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to
dismiss products liability case brought against British defendants on forum non conveniens grounds
because of desire to see California strict liability law applied).
75. See Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule l0b-5: The Myth of Congressional
Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 678 (1990).
76. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989) (arguing
that fairness to the defendant must be shown, not just that a state would further instrumental goals
by applying its laws).
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outside communities, and the most appealing existing candidates are lib-
eral ones. Not only does communitarianism seem to lack the ability to
explain state authority over nonmembers, it is also mistaken in its cri-
tique of liberalism-it erroneously suggests that the liberal project is mis-
guided and doomed to fail.
A. Contextualism
Communitarians view the community as the source of political
norms.77 It is pointless, they claim, to approach political theory founda-
tionally-seeking, that is, to uncover basic principles of political legiti-
macy that apply to all societies in all historical settings.78 Typically,
foundational efforts do little more than display the biases of particular
philosophers that reflect the particular traditions in which those philoso-
phers have been educated. Norms are contextual, not universal. It is not
possible to judge impartially whether one society is politically "better"
than another; there are no objective standards. The best that can be done
is to uncover the political values that are embedded in particular political
traditions.
If this argument is correct, then what are we to make of exercises of
state authority over individuals who are not members of the community?
One might, perhaps, take the position that there can be no political
norms to govern such interactions: anything goes.79 The decision
whether one state can apply its law to someone from another state should
be made solely according to the convenience of the community that has
the power to impose its will.80 Most of us, however, would probably not
approve such an arrangement. We seek instead to justify the assertion of
authority over outsiders and would limit authority over outsiders to cases
in which it could be properly justified. Allocation rules tell us whether it
is proper to apply the authority of one state or another.
But where would we find the principles to test whether such author-
ity is justifiable? If the communitarian position is sound, then one would
think that the principles would themselves have to arise out of some
77. See HERZOG, supra note 40, at 239.
78. See id. at 243.
79. This is similar to the position taken by the realist school of international law. For a descrip-
tion, see BErTz, supra note 65, at 15-27. This may also be the position of the interest analysis school
of choice of law. See BRILMAYER, supra note 16, at 104 (comparing international realism to interest
analysis).
80. In some cases, all communities might have the identical norms about whether an outsider is
subject to community substantive law; then the community could apply its own norms without un-
fairly imposing on outsiders by holding them to foreign norms. This is unlikely to occur, however,
unless there is some universalistic foundation for the norms of allocation of state power.
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community. They cannot be foundational norms, which would hold uni-
versally, because according to the communitarian such norms are nonex-
istent. But it would also seem that the community in question should not
simply use its own allocation norms to justify the application of its law.
If it were to offer its own allocation norms as justification, then the ques-
tion of why the state might apply its own law would remain unanswered,
for there would still be the problem of justifying the community's norms
that specify that its substantive law was applicable. The individual
would still be held to the norms of a foreign state.
If there can be no justification in terms of the norms of the forum,
then perhaps there is a different community to turn to-a community of
which the defendant is more plausibly a member. When the forum ap-
plies its law to an outsider, perhaps, it is authorized to do so by the
norms of the world community."' World community norms specify the
proper allocation of state power, and can be used to determine whether a
particular individual should be held to a particular state's laws.
The problem with this argument is that it threatens to stretch the
notion of community to the breaking point. To show why forum law can
be applied to an outsider, the communitarian must show that the out-
sider is a member of the relevant community of which the forum state is
a part. Yet to make this argument work in all cases where outsiders are
regulated, the community in question must be virtually universal. It is
one thing to justify applying U.S. law to a Canadian on the grounds that
the Canadian is a member of the same community. But the resident of
Lima, Peru must be a member of this community as well, as must the
subsistence farmer from the Laotian highlands. This strategy effectively
destroys the distinction between members and nonmembers; everyone is
a member, in the appropriate circumstances. The concept of community
loses its power to discriminate because everyone is a member of the uni-
versal community.
This world community ought to raise doubts in the minds of com-
munitarians. Community ought to be a genuine organic tie and not just
an abstract relationship. In addition, this interpretation of community
raises a strong suspicion that "community" can be used as a post hoc
rationalization for assertions of state authority that are intuitively satis-
factory for other reasons.
81. In a federal system, of course, a federal community fills this role. In such cases, the "over-
arching community" argument is much more plausible. However, in the United States at least, the
federal rules of allocation are incomplete; they restrain states to some degree, but do not uniquely
specify a correct answer. The problem of a state applying its allocation rules to an outsider is not,
therefore, completely resolved.
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B. Impact Without Membership
These "other reasons," appear on closer examination to embody dis-
tinctively liberal premises, not communitarian ones. The most intuitively
attractive way to justify regulation of outsiders is in terms of the fact that
the outsiders have somehow brought themselves into the community (by
entering a state, for instance). The relevant tests seem to be consent and
voluntariness, and the underlying rationale seems to be protection of in-
dividual autonomy.
For example, one of the primary bases for specific jurisdiction is that
the defendant has consented to jurisdiction.82 Consent can be based
upon a contractual choice of forum or choice of law clause; 3 or the de-
fendant can consent to jurisdiction at trial by failing to object to state
authority.8 4 In addition, courts in an earlier era were known to use tacit
consent as a basis for jurisdiction.8 5 Where the defendant entered the
state and committed a tort there, the state might assume that the defend-
ant had implicitly agreed to service of process by the secretary of state.8 6
The tacit consent theory is not as important as it once was, in part be-
cause other bases for specific jurisdiction have been found. One theory
espoused by the Supreme Court requires that the defendant have pur-
posefully availed himself or herself of the benefits of doing business in the
forum.87 In this way, the defendant can structure his or her conduct to
avoid being subjected to jurisdiction in the forum. 8
Norms about inferring consent from entrance into the community
or requiring that the defendant's subjection to state authority be foresee-
able or purposeful have an undeniably liberal flavor.8 9 It can be argued
that liberal theory is most valuable in precisely these cases-cases in
which different communities collide. Where the parties to a dispute are
82. Consent does not suffice for all forms of jurisdiction; federal subject matter jurisdiction, for
instance, cannot be established by the parties' consent. See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 44 (1986).
83. See National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) ("[Plarties to a con-
tract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court.").
84. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705
(1982) ("The failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction constitutes... a waiver of
the objection."); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938) (plaintiff consented to counterclaim).
85. For a discussion of some problems with tacit consent theory, see Lea Brilmayer, Consent,
Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989).
86. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
87. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
88. See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
89. It is arguable that voluntariness is just an instrumental value, with states recognizing that it
is impossible to deter unintended effects on the community. A voluntariness requirement, then,
would not necessarily reflect liberal assumptions. However, the court has consistently phrased the
voluntariness requirement in terms of fairness to individual defendants. See id. at 292.
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from different communities, it does not seem fair to resolve the contro-
versy solely according to the norms of one community or the other. At a
minimum, the decision about which community's norms to apply should
be made according to standards that are relatively distanced between the
two. 90 The defendant should not be subject to state authority without a
showing that he or she has in some way assented to state power.91 A
standard of this sort requires somehow stepping outside of particular
communities. With this motivation in mind, the liberal project is well
worth undertaking.
The problem with liberalism, perhaps, is that it views all political
relations through this lens. In trying to avoid reliance on context-specific
assumptions, and in trying not to take for granted that individuals and
groups share traditions and practices, it chooses in effect to search for
principles to regulate relations between individuals that are maximally
distant. It takes as the standard case the situation where individuals have
nothing in common, in order to build a philosophical structure upon as
few assumptions of commonality as possible. Yet surely this maximally
distant case is not the typical one. Most political relations do occur
within communities rather than between them, although this becomes
less and less true as the world grows smaller.
The communitarian should not take too much satisfaction, however,
in the fact that the liberal enterprise addresses what may be the numeri-
cally less significant question. Liberalism, even as I have described it, is
not necessarily limited to relations that cross community lines. If it
were, in fact, possible to make some progress toward the analysis of polit-
ical relations between persons from different communities, the results
might well have some relevance for purely domestic disputes. 92 If one
were able to determine what constituted the minimum principles that
political institutions must provide between communities, then this mini-
mum should not automatically be assumed to be irrelevant within com-
munities. It is one thing to say that community traditions are the sole
possible basis for political analysis, and that the search for foundational-
ist principles will necessarily end in failure; it would be another to say
90. This argument is little different from the claim that when individual interests conflict, the
dispute should be resolved by a neutral third party rather than by one of the disputants. When
community interests conflict, neither community should have the final word.
91. This is not to say that the norm of consent is unproblematical. See Brilmayer, supra note
85.
92. For a discussion related to interaction among different cultures, see MICHAEL WALZER,
INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 13-15 (1987) (questioning whether a universalist moral-
ity, even if successfully invented, would have any relevance for the societies we actually inhabit).
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that foundationalist principles exist for purposes of regulating intercom-
munity affairs, but somehow fail to have any relevance for domestic pur-
poses. Once foundationalism is shown to be possible, it is at least
arguable that it is useful within communities.
Communitarians should therefore not be quite so quick to dismiss
liberal reasoning. Liberal conclusions should be examined with an eye
toward determining their potential relevance for domestic cases. But lib-
erals should also be more open-minded about communitarian conclu-
sions. I remain unconvinced that the community can have no legitimate
claim to regulate the moral lives of its members. Some of the commu-
nity's norms are properly designed to apply to member's activities wher-
ever they occur, and where a legal rule is silent as to its territorial
applicability, the fact that the rule embodies an important moral purpose
should be taken into account in determining its extraterritorial reach.
IV. THE NEED FOR A SYNTHESIS
Political theory in domestic cases is, in one sense, overdetermined,
for there are different approaches that might explain why state power is
legitimate. State power is exercised within the community, over commu-
nity members. But these situations tend also to be cases where harm is
done to the community. Purely domestic cases possess both local trig-
gers: membership and impact. In most cases, then, it can be plausibly
argued that either the reason coercion is appropriate is because those
who are regulated are part of the community and the community takes a
moral interest in them, or because the activities complained of occur
within the community.
In the typical domestic case, the communitarian and the liberal are
likely to agree that exercise of state power is appropriate but disagree
over the reason. Is it because of membership, or the locus of activity?
One way to choose between the two theories is to examine the reasons
that each gives for state authority to see which analysis fits better with
our understandings about legitimate government. This is the task of do-
mestic political theory. In posing such questions, it helps to examine test
cases on which the two theories disagree, to see which theory provides
the more acceptable results. There are domestic cases on which the two
theories differ, such as the regulation of pornography, because com-
munitarians seem to be more inclined to regulate harmful speech than
liberals. 93
Another sort of test case is the sort that has been discussed here.
Cases that transcend state borders offer unusual opportunities to test
93. See Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 29, at 6.
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which factors really matter in political reasoning. It is as though we
could remove those factors from a fact pattern altogether, simply by
moving them to another state. We can disaggregate the relevant facts by
placing hypothetical examples in the multistate context.
Thus, for example, we can remove the factor of harm to others from
the justification by hypothesizing that the harm took place in another
state. Instead of assuming that no harm occurred, we can keep the sub-
stantive facts exactly as they are but simply posit that the harm occurred
elsewhere. Similarly, we can remove the justifying factor of community
membership by assuming that the individual in question is a member of
some other community. The substance of the hypothetical is unchanged
because the operative substantive facts are identical. This process of va-
rying hypotheticals is entirely familiar to law teachers, especially those
who teach conflict of laws. I simply suggest that this technique of geo-
graphical variation ought to be of broader interest. It can also be of
value to political philosophers who ask which factors are central to polit-
ical justification. This technique helps us to desegregate a fact pattern, to
separate the factors from one another, and to test which are of greater
importance.
In this way, problems that seem to be rather mundane turn out to
have greater significance. Jurisdictional disputes can admittedly appear
rather technical, but they reflect a much wider range of concerns than
what appears at first glance. One theory of jurisdiction-the one known
as general jurisdiction-reflects assumptions about the importance of
community membership. The other-specific jurisdiction-reflects lib-
eral assumptions that the proper basis for state intervention is the caus-
ing of harm to others.
Law does not choose between communitarianism and liberalism.
Both general and specific jurisdiction are recognized, and neither is con-
sidered more persuasive than the other. Their coexistence suggests that
there may be ways in which the two theories of justification are consis-
tent; each may be persuasive to some degree. To a political theorist, this
might suggest that the answer does not lie in communitarians showing
that the liberals are wrong, or vice versa. With luck, political theorists
may find as much of interest in the law as academic lawyers find in polit-
ical theory.
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